argument. After a brief introduction setting the stage for the research question, in Chapter 2 Shambaugh reviews the discourse on China's global identities within China, which has recently shifted toward a discussion what kind of major power China should be. Based on numerous interviews in China, and also extensive reading of Chinese scholarship, the author identifies a spectrum of Chinese global identities: Nativism-Realism-Major Powers-Asia First-Global South-Selective Multilateralism-Globalism. Neatly describing the views of each school, the author points out that IR scholars as well as officials in China tend to be eclectic thinkers; moreover, these schools of thought do not correlate with the institutions. As a result, China often displays a rather contradictory behavior in its foreign relations. Further, each of the five aspects of China's global engagement that Shambaugh examines -its global diplomatic presence, contribution to global governance, also global economic, cultural, and security presence -is discussed in a separate chapter. As a rather simple subtitle of the book suggests, Shambaugh finds China to be only a partial power. He indeed demonstrates that China is present everywhere but the impact of it is limited: "China is present and active in various parts of the globe and in various functional spheres -but is not (yet) influencing or shaping actors or events" (p.8). This is the major distinction between a partial and global power -its ability to exert influence on the outside world. Unsurprisingly, China's economic global presence is the most significant. Yet, closer examination of its four distinct aspects -trade, energy, investment, and aid -allows the author to conclude that even in this field China's global footprint is not deep enough, since it has no significant influence in global investment or aid. Although China's aid to African countries, commonly titled by the Western media "no strings attached" aid, has already received significant attention and also caused concerns as a sign of China's further penetration into African countries, Shambaugh seems not to be willing to give this too much attention. On the other hand, he foresees a considerable growth in China's overseas investments in the coming years. When it comes to diplomatic affairs, China is already deeply integrated into the international community. However, it is only a partial power, as its engagement in most of the cases is remarkably reactive and passive. Active bilateral diplomacy notwithstanding, China remains an international actor but not an international diplomatic power. On the global governance stage, three different faces of China emerge. While it sometimes appears to be positively engaging on global issues, China sometimes presents itself as highly ambivalent and mistrustful of calls from the West to contribute more to global governance; finally, sometimes it is possible to see China which views the existing international system as unequal and unfair. Thus the author concludes that China's full normative integration into the global system remains to be a work in progress. Moreover, due to Chinese political culture, the world should not expect China to become a full-fledged "responsible international stake holder". Similarly, the findings of the study are critical of China's global cultural presence pointing to its "deficit of soft power". After reviewing China's remarkable efforts to present itself abroad spending estimated 7 to 10 billion US dollars, the chapter is wrapped up with a warning that soft power is not built by investing money, instead it is earned. At the same time, China's efforts seem to have been more successful in the field of security, where it is estimated to have built No. 2 military in the world. So Shambaugh is cautious about its further development, but even this being said, he labels China a regional rather than global military power. The study appears to be based on an assumption that China is willing to challenge the existing order and, as the power transition theory suggests, replace the US. Such view eliminates the possibility that China might be taking an alternative approach seeking to carve out its own space inside of the existing international system, and at the same time also adjusting it to fit China's world view. China might not "rule the world" not because it is not capable of it as argued in the China Goes Global, but, to start with, because it has no intention of doing so as long as the international system allows it to pursue its own agenda. A more elaborate discussion on China's argument about the multipolar world as opposed to the unipolar global order, its relations with the less developed countries, also China's relations with the BRIC countries and calls for the reform of the UN Security Council might have provided a somewhat different perspective. Because as of today, China, a home to one fifth of the world's population, appears to be more obliged to meet its domestic challenges (also in consideration of regime stability) rather than seek to fundamentally change the existing global order. Although the author does not elaborate further on China's domestic affairs, he is suggesting that along with its national interests domestic situation significantly shapes its global position. The author's conclusions are somewhat straightforward: "China is, in essence, a very narrow minded, self-interested, realist state, seeking to only maximize its own national interests and power" (p.310). And this determines China's position in the global arena. It is not ready for global leadership, and moreover, according to the evidence presented in this study, is far from possessing tools to be a great global power. According to the conclusions, presented in the final Chapter 8, China is a confused rising power undergoing identity crisis. And although Shambaugh does not offer a precise strategy how the world should deal with "a globalized China," he notes that the world should not be concerned with an aggressive or threatening China as much as it should be concerned with "an insecure, confused, frustrated, angry, dissatisfied, selfish, truculent, and lonely power" (p.317). Concluding that so far China has been only a partial power, the book is presented as a call for "reconsideration of common assumptions and predictions about China's rise and potential impact on the world" (p.311). In the Asia Society conversation with analyst Ian Bremmer in February this year, Kishore Mahbubani, the Dean of the National University of Singapore and also the author of the book The Great Convergence: Asia, the West, and the Logic of One World, pointed out that "in America there is a remarkable reluctance to conceive of the world, where America is no longer number one" (Asia Society, 2013). The reader may also be able to grasp this reluctance in China Goes Global. Shambaugh repeatedly argues that China's global influence is limited. Yet, he admits that in certain areas, for example security, China's partial power posture could be changing. Especially in the last lines of the book -"China's going global will undoubtedly be the most significant development in the international relations in the years ahead. Since China's opening to the world in 1978, the world has changed China -and now China is beginning to change the world" (p.317) -there is a sense that the term "partial power" is temporary and therefore fragile. Here one guiding principle of Chinese foreign policy, put forward by Deng Xiaoping and also mentioned by Shambaugh should be borne in mind: "keep a low profile and bide our time, while also getting something accomplished". Singapore's first premier Lee Kuan Yew, well familiar with Chinese affairs, echoes this statement by saying that "the Chinese have calculated that they need 30 to 40, maybe 50, years of peace and quiet to catch up, build up their system <...> They must avoid the mistakes made by Germany and Japan" (Allison at al, 2013, p. 5) that is the "efforts to challenge the existing order" (Allison, et al, p.4). In this ever rapidly changing world, Shambaugh may be risking of giving a temporary answer. Still, this work is a timely attempt to provide a clear evaluation of China's global impact. In this comprehensive work, the author presents a large volume of data to back up his argument, which are also grounded on the author's interviews with diplomats, senior officials and Chinese scholars. By offering the first-hand knowledge on China in contemporary world, Shambaugh brings the reader as close to China as an outsider can get to. Since such an insight to the thoughts of Chinese scholars and those close to the policy making in China is more of an exception rather than common practice, readers from academic community will no doubt enjoy this well-structured and thorough study. At the same time, the book may serve as a compendium of globalized China and domestic as well as foreign scholarly debates related to it. The author neatly defines the current state of affairs demonstrating what historical developments have brought them about. For example, discussion on China's diplomatic global presence is preceded by an overview of China's diplomacy over the last few decades and an explanation of Chinese foreign policy making process. The analysis of China's cultural global presence also includes the evolution of soft power debate within China. The author also covers most of the concepts relevant to China in global affairs, such as "responsible power," "peaceful rise," "antihegemony," and many others, which definitely enhances the reader's understanding of contemporary China. He also provides an exhaustive literature overview on the matter. The work is firmly embedded into the existing debate on the issue as can be seen from the long reference list. Therefore even a reader, less familiar with Chinese affairs, will enjoy Shambaugh's latest work, and may be willing to consult it in their further studies on the subject.
The book "Happy Fish" with a subtitle "The most important allegories of Zhuangzi and their commentaries" can be considered the first important attempt to create Lithuanian translations of various full passages of the famous Daoist text named "Zhuangzi", written during the so-called Classical Period of Daoism. These translations are not only mere translations, but they are provided with interesting and valuable philosophical comments and analysis. The book also has a comparatively long introduction devoted to concise explanation of the cultural and historical background of Zhuangzi text, the encompassing Daoist tradition to which this text belongs, as well as of the main relevant concepts of ancient Chinese philosophy. The translations of Zhuangzi passages were based mostly on six different English translations, and a little bit on the original ancient Chinese. However, since the main author of the book has spent many years researching and lecturing about the ideas in Zhuangzi, and because she bases her translations and commentaries on recent academic achievements on Daoism and Zhuangzi, her translation as a whole sounds valid and authentic. Without a doubt, future Lithuanian translators, even those who will be knowledgeable in Old Chinese, will have to use this work as reference, because in understanding philosophical ideas a philosophical mind often may be more important than the ability to easily cross the language barrier. The research of philosophical Daoism and Zhuangzi in Lithuania is not a new thing. Quite a lot in this field was done by professor Antanas Andrijauskas, as well as by his students and other researchers. Such researchers as Loreta Poškaitė, Rima Sondaitė, Ieva Diemantaitė and Agnieška Juzefovič have also done some research specifically on Zhuangzi. It is also well known that quite a lot of Lithuanian philosophers and intellectuals are fascinated by Zhuangzi ideas. Agnė Budriūnaitė is not only well acquainted with Lithuanian researches on Zhuangzi, but she is also familiar with recent Western researches on Daoism and their achievements. Her introductory part on Daoism and Zhuangzi relies on such famous Daoism researchers as Livia Kohn, Louis Komathy, James Miller, Russel Kirkland, Chad Hansen, Angus Graham, Hans-Georg Moeller and others. Besides the historical philosophical introductory part and various useful glossaries and appendixes the book consists of twelve main chapters where each chapter focuses on certain allegories and ideas in Zhuangzi texts. Agnė Budriūnaitė in the preface defines the main aim of hers which is "not to embrace the whole variety of Daoist theories nor to establish a new original interpretation of Zhuangzi Daoistic philosophical ideas, but first of all wanting to present the most popular Zhuangzi allegories and stories to the students, teachers of Lithuania's high schools, to educators of gymnasiums and to all who are interested in Chinese philosophy". In another place she also says that her aim is "rather to attempt to reveal fundamental concepts of Daoism that lie in multidimensional thought of Zhuangzi allegories, relying on discourse of philosophy, but not on discourse of literature". She also mentions that the book "is aimed at translation, as a resource for further studies, but not at whole and entire analysis of Daoism's theoretical concepts and ideas". Agnė Budriūnaitė provides her translations with comparatively short commentaries which do not intend to fully research and define Zhuangzi's thought, but to point out the most prospective directions of interpreting the text. That is exactly what she is attempting in those main twelve chapters -philosophically commenting and interpreting the translations of those Zhuangzi's allegories that are considered the most popular and important. Through all these main twelve chapters Agnė Budriūnaitė is trying to let the Zhuangzi speak for himself, she is careful not to enforce her own opinions or ideas, carefully threading one Zhuangzi excerpt after another, and inserting as much or as less comments as it is needed. As an example, in the chapter "Butterfly Dream", she uses excerpts from four different Zhuangzi's chapters 2, 3, 6 and 18 aiming to present several Daoist concepts: the idea of "forgetting", versus Western philosophy's focus on "remembering"; the Daoist idea of absence of doubt versus Descartes's doubting mind; different understanding of dream and reality; as well as a perspective of a sage. In the same chapter she also creatively discusses other "popular" Daoist ideas like: "transformation of things", "following your own nature", "accepting life and death as equally important". Some of those ideas are of extreme importance in understanding Daoism and Zhuangzi so they reemerge in different places of the book, for instance, the idea of heart that embraces both feelings and mind, as well as some other cognitive capabilities of human being. Since both Zhuangzi text itself and Agnė Budriūnaitė's book are not a book that can be casually read while eating or just as a bed-time story; a lot of Zhuangzi translations as well as her commentaries require careful and slow reading, followed by focused thinking. For example, "People think that the most valuable manifestation of Dao should be found in books. But books are only collections of words. Words contain in themselves only that which is valuable -valuable things are thoughts, which they express. But those thoughts are the extension of something else, and that, which is the source of thoughts, cannot be expressed in words". This excerpt of Zhuangzi requires a reader to make a certain pause and think before continuing to read the next sentence, otherwise the eyes will read while the mind will not, which often happens with these kind of books. Later Agnė Budriūnaitė comments that usually the text is not enough to express certain things, like craftsmen's ability to do well his craft. Indeed, here Zhuangzi and Agnė Budriūnaitė by using very simple daily examples point us into direction of an experience that might be very important and significant, but cannot be easily described or transmitted. If a reader does not stop for awhile and focus on these kinds of experiences, then Zhuangzi reading will turn into bed-time bestseller reading type of book that gives an enjoyment for the moment but does not leave anything afterwards. The book is also full of small thought gems that are yet to be found by slow and thoughtful reading. Some of them are also mind shocking or going against our common sense, the others can just raise initial feeling of resistance, but later become like our own ideas. For example, in the chapter "Three in the Morning" Agnė Budriūnaitė notices that in ancient Chinese thought "knowledge" did not mean the logical affirmations or their "proof". Knowledge also didn't mean empirically acquired experience or purely theoretical conclusions. She mentions that for Zhuangzi the most important is not the "knowing what", but "knowing how". In the chapter "Basket Robbing" we find out that in Daoism any coercive change of either ourselves, or the world is a wrong path. In the chapter "The Real Man" there is a lot of discussion on the nature of a sage. An excerpt from Zhuangzi's chapter 5 sounds especially interesting and intriguing, where a man named Wang Tai, who has lost his leg, was more respected and had more students than the famous Confucius, who himself admitted that Wang Tai was wiser than him. When Confucius was asked why people prefer Wang Tai to him, Confucius answered: "People can't see their image in running water, they see it only in calm water. That which is calm, can transmit the calmness to others". Here, as Agnė Budriūnaitė notices, Confucius suddenly speaks like a Daoist thinker, pointing that people need more not wordy teachings, but peaceful heart-mind symbolized by calm surface of water or a mirror. As a researcher of ancient Chinese language and writing, I also tried to compare different Agnė Budriūnaitė's translated passages to the ancient Chinese original, trying to see how good the translation is and are there any discrepancies with the original text. Agnė Budriūnaitė has quoted the famous Zhuangzi translator Burton Watson, who said that "anybody who tries to translate this text, creates their own Zhuangzi, since the exact translation is impossible, as well as an "exact interpretation"." That being said many passages of ancient Chinese have a certain range of allowance for freedom. There are quite a lot of passages that do not create a lot of doubt in translators' minds, as well as some other passages that will always be an object of discussion. To illustrate the thought above, let us look at a short translation excerpt in the chapter "Chirping of Birds": "Thus, what can be seen when looked is form and color, what can be heard when listened is name and sound. Alas! People in the world think that through form, color, name and sound they can get to know the essence of Tao". Here, the first part of the excerpt till the "essence of Tao" is translated very similarly in many translations, and Agnė Budriūnaitė's translation also follows the original ancient Chinese very well. However, if we look carefully at the last part of "the essence of Tao", we will see that in the original Chinese text there is not the character of 道 dào nor the idea of essence, but there is a phrase "彼之情" -bǐ zhī qíng (彼bǐ that, there, he, others, the other; 之 zhī auxiliary word "of"; 情 qíng feeling, sentiment, emotion, reality). In spite of that, it is valid to interpret that part as Dao essence, but this place also could be understood as "the real feelings of someone else", like in Maliavin's Russian translation, or as "the true nature/the reality of the other", there the other as a pronoun can point to both visible and invisible nature. This example here is used rather to show the quality of "Happy Fish" translations, than the lack of it, since in the translation as a whole is quite diligently done and only very specific places may be open for different interpretations. "Happy Fish" as a book cannot be described in a couple of paragraphs, since there is no one main thread that would be connecting all these separate chapters. Every chapter discusses a comparatively wide range of Daoist ideas. Therefore, the book could be also considered as a Zhuangzi allegories reading companion or a guide with excurses to philosophical discourse. Most of this philosophical discourse is done along the lines of competent Daoist scholars researches, however Agnė Budriūnaitė, together with Aušra Vrubliauskaitė, who wrote the "Chirping of Birds" chapter and most of the appendixes, are quite brave in expanding those ideas and formulating their own understanding and interpretation of Zhuangzi text. Their interpretation, comments and questions raised, would be very good for class and group discussions, or even for larger scale philosophical seminars, not to mention about the readers who like to think and ponder over life's significant questions. In spite of all the respect to world known Daoist researchers that Agnė Budriūnaitė relies on, I would like to give only one little remark. Throughout the book one of the dominant ideas that show up again and again is that Zhuangzi is some kind of "relativist", who does not take a stand, and does not make any judgments, as a real sage. For example, p.95: "In Zhuangzi constantly a thought is repeated, that all depend on perspective" or in p.98: "Zhuangzi's relativism is "hidden" even in the words of the allegory". This is quite a popular position of "relativism" among Western intellectuals and researchers towards Zhuangzi, but it might be quite fruitful to discuss a different voice represented by Allison Robert E. in his Chuang-Tzu for Spiritual Transformation. According to Allison Zhuangzi is not just some kind of "relativist", but rather is a text for spiritual transformation, that is used to shut off the analytical mind by using certain techniques, and raise the intuition and the heart feeling. Agne Budriūnaitė mentions this book in the bibliography, but more or less does not compare Allison's ideas to the rest of researchers. However, this remark does not belittle her work and its significance, the field of Daoism research is too big to include all voices in one book, and maybe Allison's ideas do not fit in the general Happy Fish book structure. It would be of great value if Agnė Budriūnaitė as well as others would continue doing Zhuangzi's research, interpreting and translating in the future, since this book as she humbly mentioned was just a prelude into such kind of research. Happy Fish is a very valuable contribution into Lithuanian research of Zhuangzi and Daoism, and it is quite possible that eventually some of the ideas will be translated into other languages, and their value would expand beyond Lithuanian speaking public reaching also the researchers in other languages. This article reviews Adrian Chan's Orientalism in Sinology. His main thesis is that sinologists tend to think that they are not vulnerable to Orientalist and ethnocentric thinking, but they are. Edward Said's Orientalism sparked a fierce debate when it was first published and his most notable work remains contentious even today. Orientalism in Said's parlance has come to mean the West imposing its own worldview on the Orient. The Western discourse is always the dominating one, or even the only conceivable one. The Orientalist discourse seeks in Said's mind to create the Orient and to control it. (Said 2003 p. 3, 204.) . Adrian Chan provides generous arguments to make his case and begins Orientalism in Sinology by recounting the experiences of the early Western work on China that shaped the field to what it is today. In the beginning there were the Christian missionaries in China. Driven by the need to convert the Chinese to Christianity they had to learn the local culture and language, but at the same time change it to suit their needs. The knowledge they gathered had merely instrumental value in the project of converting the Chinese and saving their souls. Intellectual dishonesty had sown the seeds for Orientalism in sinology. From there on the later sinologists would follow the tradition, perhaps without even realising that they were doing so. They might have even had the best of intentions, such as the case of James Legge. Chan relates this idea in a rather telling little snippet by Legge: "A few verbal alterations were made to make the meaning clearer.". In Chan's narrative in those few translation choices Legge "changed China's culture by translation.". What he did is seemingly innocuous; Legge chose to render shàng dì as God. Shàng (supreme, high) and dì (emperor) can be linked together and rendered god, but at a cost. The price is that you lose all of the original associations with shàng dì. The gain however is twofold for Legge. Firstly, it is now much easier for him to convey the Chinese text to the reader since he can use the readily understood concept of god and secondly, Legge can now, as per Chan's words, change the Chinese culture that he is transferring to the reader. Unfortunately that inevitably transferred Western notions of "God" to a concept that it did not have before. Successive generations henceforth were led to assume that shàng dì was a similar personalised being as the Christian God is. This is, as Chan points out, a type example of Saidian supplanting vocabulary. By rendering shàng dì as God Orientalist sinologists can deny the uniqueness of Chinese culture. The irony of it is almost unbearable, that someone dedicated to studying and understanding a different culture would so eagerly deny its very uniqueness, but ethnocentrism is an insidious trap that everyone, regardless of ethnicity can fall into. The problems of translating from Chinese to English are apparent such as the aforementioned issues with shàng dì, but more noteworthy is the notion of how unwilling the West is to adopt Chinese terminology even when borrowing from Chinese would be the natural approach. The English language is certainly no stranger to loanwords, French and Latin are the most obvious offenders. Chan raises what at first seems like a trivial point, but becomes interesting after a more careful consideration. Why are the teachings of Confucius referred to as 'Confucianism' in English and not 'rú jiā' (school of rú ) as it is in Chinese? Referring to rú jiā as Confucianism is, of course, a long-established practice and there is nothing inherently wrong with that. It would be a fool's errand to try to change the practice. However, it would be useful to remind oneself every now and then why it is so. The answer lies in the Orientalist modus operandi. According to Chan the use of Chinese terms would mean treating the Chinese culture as equal to the Western one. This would, however, go against the long-established tradition of sinology treating the very subject it studies as inferior. While Chan devotes considerable time to early Christian missionaries' attempts to enforce European worldview on China the implications are relevant even to modern China scholars. The forefathers of sinology can be forgiven imposing their own worldview on China, after all they could not see other different worldviews than their own. Chan points, however, out that even in the current time the same pattern repeats. He describes what, in his view, was a futile and misguided attempt to find a Western styled civil society in China by the most eminent China scholars of the day. They were using Jürgen Habermas' The Structural Transformation of The Public Sphere as a starting point in their quest to find a Western styled civil society in China. Although in this case he's inclined to lay the blame on the researchers' lack of understanding of their own culture and their inability to keep up with the latest forays in social science than in any inherent Orientalist traits. Ironically he also muses that Habermas' influence on the eminent sinologists is connected to the notion that the Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere was released in English in the turbulent year of 1989. He goes on to assert that Habermas and the Tiananmen protests are both "grossly and outrageously misread". At least in the case of Habermas it is easy to see where the problem lies. Habermas' work applies specifically to a certain time and a certain place. Attempting to apply his work as it is to China is destined to fail. Chan's critique gets almost gleefully cheeky by this point when he specifically calls out a sinologist misreading Habermas in his search for a civil society in China. The case in point sees, in Chan's description, yet another eminent sinologist missing the point altogether. This time the sinologist is trying to connect the coffee houses and pubs in Europe to teahouses in China, as if the mere action of drinking in company or the chemicals in the said drinks were responsible for the emergence of civil society. Naturally the problem arises from the scholars' desire to view the world through their own cultural predispositions and negate the uniqueness of both the Western world and China. The time and place that Habermas describes was a unique mix of history and contemporary development not seen in China. It, however, should not be seen that it is impossible to find a civil society in China; actually, I would argue that the case is quite the contrary. It is only when the Orientalist sinologists declare Habermas as universally applicable to China as well as the 17 th and 18 th century Europe they go astray. Chan uses the example with Habermas to reveal a problem with sinology. By the time a researcher has earned his or her PhD they have spent years learning about a foreign culture and while doing so they have neglected to learn about their own. Thus they may lack the required tools to properly understand, for example, Habermas. They then naively go to expect that social science and phases in historical development are somehow universal, when they emphatically are not. It is a pattern that repeats itself time and time again in Chan's account of Orientalism in Sinology, intelligent and sincere scholars who for one reason or another cannot shed their own cosmogonies and cultural predispositions when describing and learning about China. None of the above should be taken to mean that I would fully subscribe to Chan's views. Nor do I believe that everyone involved in the field of sinology is Orientalist, because I would like to believe that the academically minded and educated scholars would have more insight to their own thought processes. At every step of the way the researcher should take time aside for self-reflection, particularly when it comes to making sweeping generalisations based on the Western experience. In his preface to Orientalism in Sinology Chan relates a senior colleague's doubt that sinologists would be vulnerable to Orientalist thinking. Recognising Orientalist thinking is the most important insight to take out of Chan's work. Particularly those who would vehemently deny that they are Orientalists should take time to question that assertion. Naturally, no one would ever confess to be an Orientalist, it is a sign of intellectual weakness at best and a sign of dishonesty at worst. Against this background it is no wonder that his project was met with scepticism. Chan definitely makes a compelling case in regards to some of the people he specifically calls out, but he does not say anything definitely condemning about the field in general or the people who practice it. He does warn about the elder generation of researchers, with their unconscious Orientalist views, merrily passing their wisdom down to the young eager minds starting their careers. If this is the case it is truly worrying as Orientalism is both deep-rooted in the field as well as being an insidious trap that offers a tempting shortcut to understanding a foreign culture. I'd like to think that the younger generation of scholars and future researchers are better equipped to recognise and resist this kind of thinking. That said, if one paints a picture of sinology using only Orientalism in Sinology it will be a very bleak painting indeed. Overall, then Chan's work, at the very least, serves as a useful reminder of the pitfalls of ethnocentrism.
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